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Abstract
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, banks faced extreme
difficulty in issuing new debt and finding affordable sources of funds due to heightened fears
over counterparty solvency and liquidity risk. By the end of September, the TED spread had
spiked to 464 basis points, and issuance of commercial paper fell 88%. On October 14th, to
boost confidence and lower short-term financing costs, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation announced the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP) as part of the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). Under the DGP, the FDIC guaranteed in full a limited
amount of senior unsecured debt newly issued by insured depository institutions and
certain bank holding companies that did not opt out of the program. Other affiliates of
insured depositories were also able to apply to the FDIC for eligibility on a case-by-case basis.
If an institution defaulted on a guaranteed bond, the FDIC would cover all payments on
interest and principal. In exchange for receiving the guarantee, institutions paid a fee based
on the bond’s maturity. The issuance window was set to expire on June 30, 2009, but was
extended to October 31, 2009. An additional Emergency Guarantee facility, created at the
time of extension, had an issuance window that expired on April 30, 2010, but was never
used. Over the course of the program, the 122 participating institutions raised over $600
billion in guaranteed debt. The FDIC paid out about $153 million due to defaults from six
institutions, and collected $10.2 billion in fees.
Keywords: senior unsecured debt, interbank credit, guarantee program, commercial
paper, Lehman Brothers, Columbus Day interventions

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs.
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Debt Guarantee Program of the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program
At a Glance
In the wake of the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy and the failures of AIG,
Washington Mutual, and Wachovia in
mid-September
2008,
interbank
lending had all but frozen. As a result,
by early October, even the most solvent
institutions found it difficult to roll over
their short-term obligations and access
long-term financing.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To ease stress and restore confidence and
liquidity in U.S. interbank lending and promote access to
unsecured funding markets for banks and other financial
institutions.
Announcement Date

October 14, 2008

Operational Date

October 14, 2008

To restart interbank lending and Date of First Guaranteed October 14, 2008
promote stability in the unsecured Loan Issuance
funding market for banks and other Issuance Window
June 30, 2009, (initial) then
financial
institutions,
the
FDIC Expiration Date
amended to October 31,
announced the Temporary Liquidity
2009
Guarantee Program’s Debt Guarantee
No explicit cap
Program (DGP) on October 14, 2008, as Program Size
122 participating
part of a coordinated effort, along with Usage
institutions – $618 billion in
the Federal Reserve and Treasury
guaranteed debt
Department, to “bolster public
confidence in […] financial institutions Outcomes
Six defaults totaling $153
and
throughout
the
American
million; $10.4 billion in fees.
economy.” DGP extended an FDICOpt-out structure with
backed
guarantee, for up
to Notable Features
automatic enrollment
approximately three years, to certain
senior unsecured debt newly issued by program participants between October 14, 2008 and
June 30, 2009. Under the DGP, insured depository institutions and certain bank holding
companies that did not opt out of the program were eligible to participate. Other affiliates of
insured depositories were also able to apply for eligibility.
To ensure an orderly transition, the FDIC extended the program twice. First, the FDIC
extended the issuance window to October 31, 2009, and the guarantee to December 31,
2012. Second, the FDIC established a six-month Emergency Guarantee Facility to cover debt
issued between October 31, 2009, and April 30, 2010, but this was never used. When the
guarantee expired on December 31, 2012, the FDIC had collected $10.4 billion in fees and
paid out $153 million due to defaults by six institutions.
Summary Evaluation
It is difficult to determine whether the DGP directly caused the observed changes in credit
markets since two additional programs, the Treasury’s Capital Purchase Program and the
Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility, were announced around the same
time as the DGP. However, there is overall consensus that the DGP lowered borrowing costs
for banks and improved liquidity in unsecured funding markets for banks and other financial
institutions.
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Debt Guarantee Program of the
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: United States Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$14,681.5 billion in 2007
$14,559.5 billion in 2008

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$47,976 in 2007
$48,383 in 2008

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:
Sovereign credit rating
(5-year senior debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Size of banking system

Source: Bloomberg
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008

Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of
financial system

5-bank concentration of
banking system

Source: Bloomberg
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial
system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial
system in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
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Foreign involvement in
banking system

Government ownership
of banking system
Existence of deposit
insurance

22% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for
2008
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Overview

Background
In the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the failures of AIG, Washington Mutual,
and Wachovia in mid-September 2008, the interbank lending market was all but frozen.
First, widespread fears of counterparty insolvency spooked creditors. Demand for CDS
protection against large institutions surged, causing prices to increase. Faced with high risk
and a high cost of hedging against losses, firms only agreed to lend at high rates, with more
collateral, and for short periods of time (Brunnermeier, 2009). Reflecting greater perceived
risk in the credit markets, the TED spread spiked, reaching a high of 464 basis points on
October 10 (Cave, 2011).
Second, many firms chose to hoard liquidity to cover both on- and off-balance sheet losses
(Berrospide, 2013). On balance sheet, banks were uncertain of their exposure to the recent
flurry of financial institution failures. Off balance sheet, banks worried that corporations
would draw on committed lines of credit or that they would be called on to extend liquidity
to troubled affiliates in the shadow banking system. Since many large financial institutions
both lent to and borrowed from one another, major firms were simultaneously in need of
financing and unwilling to lend (Turner, 2012).
With this “perfect storm” of factors increasing borrowing costs, interbank credit markets and
other unsecured funding sources for banks and other financial institutions virtually
collapsed. From mid-September to the end of the month, the issuance of longer-term AA
asset-backed commercial paper, which banks traditionally used to cover their short-term
debt, fell 82%, while issuance of other commercial paper fell 88% (Cave, 2011). In perhaps
the most dramatic show of credit-market pessimism, senior unsecured debt issuance fell
94% year-on-year in September (COP, 2009).
As a result, by early October, even the most solvent institutions found it difficult to roll over
their short-term obligations and access long-term financing. Without access to credit
markets, firms would have to liquidate assets at fire sale prices, potentially causing many to
become insolvent. A systemic crisis loomed. On October 10, 2008, the G7 nations agreed to a
plan of action that included “tak[ing] all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money
markets and ensure that banks and other financial institutions have broad access to liquidity
and funding.”
Program Description
To restart the interbank lending market and promote access to unsecured funding markets
for banks and other financial institutions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
announced the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program’s (TLGP) Debt Guarantee Program
(DGP) on October 14, 2008, as part of a coordinated effort, along with the Federal Reserve
and Treasury Department, to “bolster public confidence in […] financial institutions and
throughout the American economy.” The legal basis for the program came from an exception
set forth in the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 that allowed the FDIC to deviate from its
normal approach to assisting troubled institutions upon a finding of systemic risk by the
Treasury Secretary (in consultation with the President and after receiving recommendations
from the FDIC Board of Directors and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors). Other
elements of the coordinated effort included:
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(a) the TLGP’s Transaction Account Guarantee Program (a blanket guarantee on
non-interest-bearing transaction accounts at participating banks and thrifts);
(b) a Capital Purchase Program to provide up to $250 billion for capital injections
into viable financial firms; and
(c) a Commercial Paper Funding Facility to purchase eligible commercial paper
directly from issuers.
The DGP was intended to “unlock inter-bank credit markets and restore rationality to credit
spreads” with the goal of facilitating bank liquidity. Reducing borrowing costs in the
interbank market also aimed to expand credit access throughout the economy by “free[ing]
up funding for banks to make loans to creditworthy businesses and consumers” (Bair 2008).
Additionally, the loan guarantees announced by other countries would have placed U.S.
institutions on an “uneven playing field,” so the DGP prevented international banks from
enjoying an unfair competitive advantage over U.S.-based ones (Bair 2008). This was
significant because the guaranteeing of bank debt was an approach that was then being
adopted in most advanced economies consistent with the G7’s call to take all steps necessary
to unfreeze credit and money markets.
An Interim Rule published on October 29, 2008, provided the initial guidelines for the
program. To assuage fears over counterparty risk, the DGP extended an FDIC-backed
guarantee to certain senior unsecured debt issued by program participants between October
14, 2008, and June 30, 2009. Eligible institutions included FDIC-insured banks and certain
bank and financial holding companies. Other affiliates of insured depositories could also
apply for participation, with eligibility determined by the FDIC on a case-by-case basis.
To promote widespread participation, the FDIC automatically enrolled all eligible
institutions upon announcing the program (other than the nonbank financial institutions
that were required to apply for eligibility). Institutions not wishing to participate had to opt
out by December 5, 2008, after which point all institutions remaining in the program paid a
fee on newly-issued guaranteed debt and signed a master agreement that specified the legal
requirements for participating in the program (12 CFR §370.2[g]). A firm that chose to opt
out could not opt back in at a later date and vice versa (12 CFR §370.2[f][1]).
Under the Interim Rule, the DGP guaranteed in-full senior unsecured, unsubordinated debt
issued by participating institutions through maturity or until June 30, 2012, whichever came
first. To discourage firms from utilizing exotic financial instruments, the guarantee only
applied to debt that did not have any embedded options, forwards, swaps, or other
derivatives (12 CFR §370.2[e]). To avoid subsidizing excessive expansion or risk-taking by
banks while still enabling firms to roll over existing obligations, the FDIC set a cap on the
total amount of guaranteed debt a firm could issue. The guarantee covered up to 125% of
the amount of outstanding senior unsecured debt the firm had as of September 30, 2008,
that reached maturity before June 30, 2009. Institutions could only issue non-guaranteed
debt before they hit the cap if they paid an additional fee at the outset of the program (to
prevent banks from only applying to guarantee their riskiest debt). They had to both (a) pay
a one-time fee of 37.5 basis points times the amount of senior unsecured debt outstanding
as of September 30, 2008, and maturing before June 30, 2009, and (b) notify the FDIC of the
intention to issue non-guaranteed debt before December 5, 2008. Such non-guaranteed debt
had to have a maturity beyond June 30, 2012.
Firms paid a percentage of guaranteed debt’s face value as a fee for participating in the DGP.
Under the Interim Rule, the FDIC adopted a flat annualized fee of 75 basis points for all
guaranteed issuances. However, if the funds collected through the initial fees were
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insufficient to cover losses under the program, the FDIC would levy an additional fee on all
FDIC-insured institutions, whether or not they participated in the program (12 CFR §370.6).
A Final Rule adopted by the FDIC on November 21, 2008, made several significant
amendments to the DGP in response to feedback from market participants. First, debt with
maturities of 30 days or less was excluded from the program. Second, the cap on an
individual firm’s participation would be calculated using 2% of its total consolidated
liabilities as of September 30, 2008, if it did not have any senior unsecured debt outstanding
as of that date. Third, the ability to exercise the guarantee would be triggered by the first
payment default under a guaranteed bond rather than requiring the bankruptcy/resolution
of the issuing institution. Fourth, the 75-basis-point flat fee would be replaced with a scale
ranging from 50 basis points to 100 basis points based on maturity.
Initially, firms could no longer issue guaranteed debt under the DGP after June 30, 2009. To
ensure an orderly transition, the FDIC extended the program twice. First, the FDIC extended
the issuance window to October 31, 2009, and the guarantee until December 31, 2012.
Eligible institutions could opt out of the extension, and all firms that originally opted out of
the program had to re-apply for coverage. A surcharge of 25 basis points (for insured
depositories) or 50 basis points (for other participants) would be applied for debt issued on
or after April 1, 2009.
Second, the FDIC established a six-month Emergency Guarantee Facility to cover debt issued
between October 31, 2009, and April 30, 2010. Eligible institutions had to specifically apply
for the program and regulators determined an even higher fee (at least 300 basis points) on
a case-by-case basis. Ultimately no institutions made use of the Emergency Guarantee
Facility.
Outcomes
The initial reaction to the DGP was generally positive (Shapiro and Dowson, 2012). Most
lauded the program as an excellent way to lower borrowing costs and unlock liquidity in the
market. However, some firms, principally ones that felt they could already cheaply access
credit markets, said the program would increase their borrowing costs, since remaining in
the program would require them to pay fees, but opting out would force them to pay higher
interest rates as investors flocked to guaranteed debt. Still others worried that the program
would suffer from adverse selection, with stronger firms opting out and only weaker firms,
more prone to default, participating (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72249, 2008). The FDIC
sought to assuage these fears through the Final Rule amendments discussed above.
At the outset of DGP, the FDIC estimated that the maximum amount of debt covered would
be around $1.4 trillion, if all eligible institutions participated and issued debt up to the cap
(Technical Briefing on the TLGP 1, 2008). Around 14,000 entities were eligible to participate
in the DGP, and approximately half opted into the program. Over the duration of the program,
122 institutions raised over $600 billion in guaranteed debt, all of which received AAAratings, compared to the historical AA rating agencies gave senior unsecured debt from the
biggest banks (COP, 2009). At its peak, the DGP guaranteed $346 billion in outstanding
obligations, amounting to two-thirds of total outstanding senior unsecured debt,
demonstrating the widespread participation in the program by those issuing debt (Black et
al, 2014). Indeed, 92% of eligible firms with assets over $10 billion participated (COP, 2009).
Based on the maturity composition of the debt, it appears that banks and other financial
institutions primarily used the guarantee program to secure medium- and long-term
financing: around 90% of debt issued matured in between one and three years, and by
October 2009, only 5% of outstanding guaranteed debt matured in less than a year.
Additionally, banks used the guarantee less frequently over the duration of the program.
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Issuance of newly-issued guaranteed debt peaked at $113 billion in December 2008; by
August 2009, banks only issued $5 billion. Larger banks, with assets over $10 billion, were
more likely to take advantage of the program, both in terms of the gross number and size of
loans issued. However, when smaller banks did participate, they appeared to rely on the
program more heavily. While larger banks together issued only 65% of their aggregate cap,
smaller banks reached about 100% of their cap (Ambrose et al, 2013).
Some of the largest users of the program were not banks. For example, the FDIC guaranteed
up to $139 billion of debt issued by GE Capital, the financing arm of General Electric (Layne
and Christie, 2008). By the end of the program, GE Capital was among the heaviest users of
the DGP (Glader and Ng, 2009).
The fees collected by the program significantly exceeded losses incurred. When the
guarantee expired on December 31, 2012, the FDIC had collected $10.4 billion in fees and
paid out $153 million due to defaults by six institutions (FDIC, 2013).
Over the course of the program, the cost of borrowing using guaranteed debt fell
substantially. The price of interbank credit as measured by LIBOR declined by 446 basis
points between October 13, 2008, and September 30, 2009; during the same period, the TED
spread fell by 443 basis points. Spreads between both guaranteed and non-guaranteed
senior debt and Treasury securities dropped by the end of the program. By February 2011,
three-year guaranteed bonds traded at about 13 basis points above three-year Treasury
securities, while the spread for comparable non-guaranteed bonds stood at 112 basis points
(Cave, 2011).
However, it is difficult to determine whether the DGP directly caused the observed changes
in credit markets for two reasons. First, spreads may have stabilized due to natural
corrections in the interbank market once investors recognized that most banks remained
fundamentally solvent in the aftermath of the subprime crisis. Second, two additional
programs, the Treasury Department’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Federal
Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), were announced around the same time
as the DGP. The CPP, which injected $125 billion in capital into nine of the biggest banks in
the U.S. and was announced at the same press conference as the DGP, may have reduced
investors’ perception of counterparty risk and contributed to the decline in credit spreads.
The CPFF, initiated the week before DGP, also targeted liquidity in the interbank debt market
by allowing the NY Fed to purchase highly rated unsecured and asset-backed commercial
paper (GAO, 2010). Despite those challenges in isolating causality, the persistent spread
between guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt suggests that at least some of the decline in
borrowing costs for firms participating in DGP resulted from the guarantee program itself.
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Figure 1: Debt Spreads vs. Three-Year Treasury Securities

Source: FSOC Annual Report 2011

Figure 2: Utilization of Guaranteed Debt Over Time

Source: Treasury Report 2009

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The DGP was introduced together with a blanket guarantee on non-interestbearing transaction accounts and alongside programs to provide capital injections
and purchase commercial paper.
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In addition to the DGP, the TLGP had a second component called the Transaction Account
Guarantee Program that provided a blanket guarantee on non-interest-bearing transaction
accounts at participating banks and thrifts. These transaction accounts were of the type
commonly used to meet payroll and other business purposes. The TAGP sought to prevent a
run on such accounts by providing them with a full guarantee. At introduction the TAGP was
designed to last until December 31, 2009, but the FDIC subsequently extended this
termination date to December 31, 2010.
U.S. policymakers also introduced (or first explained) two additional programs on October
14th that were seen as linked to the DGP. The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) announced by
Treasury at the same press conference as the TLGP provided up to $250 billion for capital
injections into viable financial institutions. Authorities informed the nine major financial
institutions that were the initial recipients of capital injections pursuant to the CPP that
participation in the CPP was a requirement for accessing the DGP. This was both (a) so that
the institutions would have larger capital buffers and thus be less likely to impose losses on
the DGP by defaulting on guaranteed debt and (b) to avoid the stigma that might result from
certain major financial institutions participating in the DGP while others declined to do so.
No other institutions were explicitly required to accept capital via the CPP in order to
participate in the DGP, but the two programs were generally seen as complementary.
On October 14, the Federal Reserve Board also provided details of the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF) it had enacted on October 7. Under the CPFF, a specially created
limited liability company would use funds borrowed from the Federal Reserve Board of New
York to purchase eligible commercial paper directly from issuers. This was intended to
provide liquidity to commercial paper issuers otherwise unable to access it due to strains in
the commercial paper market.
2. The legal basis for the program came from a systemic risk exception set forth in
the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.
The FDIC established the TLGP (and thus the DGP) under the authority of the FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Enacted in the wake of a series of thrift failures in the
late 1980s and early 1990s that left the FDIC’s insurance fund seriously undercapitalized,
the FDICIA required “least-cost resolution,” meaning that the FDIC had to select a method of
providing assistance to troubled insured depository institutions that would minimize the
cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund. However, the law included a “systemic risk” exception
that authorized the FDIC to bypass the least-cost resolution requirement if following it
“would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability” and
overlooking it “would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.” In the event of any loss to the
Deposit Insurance Fund stemming from an action undertaken based on the systemic risk
exception, the law requires the FDIC to recover that loss through “1 or more special
assessments on insured depository institutions, depository institution holding companies
(with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to holding companies),
or both, as the [FDIC] determines to be appropriate.”3
_____________________________________________________________________
3

12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)
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On October 13, 2008, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President,
invoked the systemic risk exception to facilitate the TLGP based on the recommendations of
at least two-thirds of the FDIC’s Board of Directors and two-thirds of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, all as required by law.4
3. There does not appear to have been any explicit total cap on the amount that could
be guaranteed.
Program documents did not contain any mention of a limit on the amount of guaranteed debt
that could be issued under the DGP.
4. FDIC-insured depository institutions, bank holding companies and nonbank
financial companies were eligible to participate in the program.
While the FDIC was working with the Treasury and Federal Reserve on the development of
the DGP, an initial difference of opinion existed on the range of institutions that should be
eligible for the program. The FDIC, whose historical mandate and experience revolved
around the protection of insured depository institutions, sought to limit the program to such
institutions. The Treasury and Federal Reserve argued for the inclusion of a broad range of
nonbank financial institutions. Ultimately, those eligible for the DGP included insured
depository institutions and bank and financial holding companies. The inclusion of holding
companies stemmed from the observation that the senior unsecured debt covered by the
DGP was typically issued at the holding company level in most holding company structures,
with the holding companies then providing liquidity to their depository institution
subsidiaries. (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72244 and 72250, 2008)
The DGP also allowed for the participation of other affiliates of insured depository
institutions, provided that such affiliates would be admitted on a case-by-case basis in the
sole discretion of the FDIC based on “such factors as (1) the extent of the financial activity of
the entities within the holding company structure; (2) the strength, from a ratings
perspective, of the issuer of the obligations that will be guaranteed; and (3) the size and
extent of the activities of the organization” (Ibid.).
The rules implementing the DGP enabled the FDIC, working with the other federal
regulators, to monitor and limit use of the facility by weaker institutions. In particular,
institutions with the lowest supervisory ratings were barred from participating.
5. The FDIC automatically enrolled eligible institutions in the program, with a onetime, non-reversible option to opt-out.
The FDIC designed the DGP’s enrollment structure to convince as many eligible institutions
as possible to participate, regardless of their credit risk (Technical Briefing on the TLGP 2,
2008). The FDIC believed that automatic enrollment and an opt-out structure would
_____________________________________________________________________
After the crisis, the FDIC’s use of the systemic risk exception to enact a widely available guarantee program
came under significant legal scrutiny, and the Dodd-Frank Act curtailed the FDIC’s authority to introduce a
program like the DGP.
4
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normalize program participation, encourage stable banks to issue guaranteed debt, and
collect sufficient fees to cover potential program losses. Moreover, the FDIC played on
institutions’ risk aversion by not allowing them to rejoin the program later if they opted out
by the December 5 deadline (initially November 12, but later extended). Some institutions
without financing problems in October and November still chose to participate, since they
worried they would suffer unexpected illiquidity in the future.
Officials wanted to maximize participation in the program for two reasons. First, they
believed that strained access to credit was widespread, so many firms would have to
participate to meaningfully calm markets. Second, they wanted to minimize adverse
selection, where firms most likely to default would be the only ones participating. If the
market viewed participation as a signal that a firm was insolvent, then the DGP would not
cut borrowing costs for solvent firms with liquidity problems. Additionally, if only troubled
firms participated, then the FDIC would have to either (1) suffer massive losses as a result of
the program; or (2) increase participation fees, which would only exacerbate adverse
selection and increase borrowing costs further (GAO, 2009).
The one exception to the DGP’s opt-out structure were the insured depository institutionaffiliates discussed above, who had to apply to the FDIC to participate.
6. The Program covered senior unsecured debt without any embedded swaps,
options, futures, or other derivatives.
The purpose of the DGP was to promote liquidity and stability in interbank unsecured
lending markets. To do so, regulators believed it best to only guarantee senior debt.
The DGP specifically excluded unsecured debt with embedded instruments for two reasons.
First, the FDIC wanted to promote stability, confidence, and transparency in securities
markets, but “not to encourage innovative, exotic or complex funding structures” (Federal
Register 73 [229]: 72245, 2008). Second, officials worried that weak banks would use
derivatives to obscure underlying risk (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72252, 2008). As such,
extending guarantees to those instruments could expose the FDIC to additional risk without
meaningfully improving liquidity.
When Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke approached the FDIC
Chair Shelia Bair about guaranteeing bank debt, Bair was reluctant to proceed. She worried
that the program would potentially expose the FDIC to huge losses and questioned how such
a guarantee program fulfilled the FDIC’s depositor protection role. However, recognizing the
risks of a prolonged liquidity crisis, she proposed a program that would guarantee 90% of
newly-issued senior unsecured debt. Paulson and Bernanke insisted that a 90% guarantee
would not be sufficient to calm markets, and Bair compromised on a program that would
cover 100% of certain debt, but only within a limited time frame (Bair, 2011).
7. Initially, debt of any maturity was eligible, but the guarantee only lasted until June
30, 2012.

557

Debt Guarantee Program of the TLGP

Katz

Initially, debt of any maturity could be issued pursuant to the DGP. The guarantee on such
debt would then last until maturity or June 30, 2012 (whichever came first). Subsequent
amendments later altered this approach.
First, the Final Rule issued on November 21, 2008, excluded debt with maturities of 30 days
or less. The FDIC observed that, while other federal programs had improved liquidity in
short-term funding markets, institutions still struggled to access longer-term unsecured
funding. Thus, the DGP would “help institutions to obtain stable, longer-term sources of
funding where liquidity is currently most lacking” by focusing on maturities of more than
thirty days (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72251, 2008).
Second, an amendment to the DGP adopted on June 3, 2009, extended the life of the
guarantee to December 31, 2012, for debt issued on or after April 1, 2009. The FDIC adopted
this extension of the guarantee alongside an extension of the issuance window for
guaranteed debt from June 30, 2009, to October 31, 2009, as described in more detail below.
During the life of the DGP, some market participants suggested that the FDIC extend the
guarantee to as long as ten years given that “real money investors” such as pension funds
and insurance companies were more active in longer-term markets. However, the FDIC
rejected these suggestions, arguing that extending guarantees to longer-term debt would not
be necessary to improve liquidity to interbank and unsecured term debt markets (Federal
Register 73 [229]: 72253, 2008).
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible.
Program documents did not contain any language restricting the currencies that were
eligible for the DGP.
9. Participating institutions could only issue guaranteed debt equal to 125% of
outstanding senior unsecured debt maturing by June 30, 2009.
In order to ensure that the DGP was used to rollover existing debt rather than significantly
expand debt issuance, the FDIC imposed a cap on the amount of guaranteed debt that a
participating institution could issue. The FDIC set this cap at 125% of senior unsecured debt
outstanding on September 30, 2008, that would mature by June 30, 2009.
Initially, institutions with no senior unsecured debt outstanding on September 30, 2008,
could apply to the FDIC for eligibility to issue an amount of debt to be determined by the
FDIC. However, concerns that such an approach might delay determinations of eligibility
amounts resulted in the exploration of other options. In the Final Rule issued on November
21, 2008, the FDIC established a cap equal to 2% of consolidated total liabilities as of
September 30, 2008, for institutions with no senior unsecured debt outstanding. For all
participating institutions, the FDIC could increase or decrease these caps should it deem it
necessary after consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency.
These caps were particularly significant because, with one exception noted below,
participating institutions were not permitted to issue non-guaranteed debt until the caps
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were reached. Eligible institutions strongly opposed this measure. Critics made numerous
arguments in favor of allowing any institution to issue non-guaranteed debt at will before
hitting the cap, including that a prohibition on non-guaranteed issuance would limit
flexibility, cause healthy banks to avoid the program, and result in a competitive
disadvantage relative to the UK’s Credit Guarantee Scheme (Federal Register 73 [229]:
72255-6, 2008).
Despite these concerns, the FDIC decided to maintain the prohibition on non-guaranteed
issuance under the cap for several stated reasons. The “[f]irst, and most important” reason
the FDIC retained the rule was to avoid adverse selection, where banks only sought to have
guaranteed the debt that they were least likely to repay. On a more pragmatic note, the FDIC
worried that widespread issuance of non-guaranteed debt under the cap would lead to
confusion about what bonds received the guarantee, while the existing structure would calm
markets through consistency (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72255-6, 2008).
The one exception to the prohibition on non-guaranteed issuance was for institutions that
affirmatively made an election by a specified date to have the right to issue non-guaranteed
debt under the cap and paid a fee for the right equal to 37.5 basis points times the amount of
unsecured debt outstanding as of September 30, 2008, maturing by June 30, 2009. Such
institutions could issue non-guaranteed debt with maturities greater than June 30, 2012, at
any time.
The FDIC also barred banks from using the proceeds from guaranteed debt to prepay debt
that was not guaranteed.
10. The FDIC initially adopted an annualized fee of 75 basis points but later shifted to
a range from 50 to 100 basis points based on maturity.
Initially, the FDIC charged a flat annualized rate of 75 basis points on all guaranteed debt, a
weighted average of CDS spreads in 2007 (before the subprime crisis hit) and September
2008 (when spreads reached several hundred basis points). The 75-basis-point figure
represented the sentiment that by late 2008, default risk was higher than usual but lower
than during the height of the crisis (Technical Briefing on the TLGP 1, 2008).
However, the 75-basis-point fee proved prohibitively high for short-term borrowing, with
institutions reliant on short-term credit threatening to opt out of the program entirely. In
response, in the Final Rule adopted November 21, 2008, the FDIC introduced a range from
50 basis points to 100 basis points based on maturity as follows:
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Figure 3: DGP Fee Scale

Source: Federal Register 73(229): 72251, 2008.
This range was increased with the June 3, 2009, amendment to the DGP extending its
issuance window and guarantee. For debt issued on or after April 1, 2009, surcharges of 25
basis points (for insured depositories) or 50 basis points (for other participants) would be
applied. For any debt issued pursuant to the Emergency Guarantee Facility, a minimum
annualized fee of 300 basis points would apply.
The FDIC considered adopting a fee structure where institutions with a higher credit risk
paid higher premiums. Such an approach ensures riskier firms bear higher costs for
participating in the program, maintaining market discipline. However, officials said they
opted against this approach for practical reasons. The FDIC did not have the time to properly
assess differential risk among banks. In addition, the FDIC lacked the regulatory
infrastructure and statutory authority to assess the riskiness of bank holding companies and
nonbank financial institutions, which, as non-insured institutions, did not fall under the
FDIC’s jurisdiction (COP 2009).
Officials at the Federal Reserve urged the FDIC to include bank holding companies and thrifts
in the guarantee program as a crucial way to restore liquidity. However, including holding
companies and thrifts initially introduced a legal challenge. In the event that program losses
exceeded fees, the FDIC had planned to make use of its “special assessment” authority to
collect a special fee from all institutions with federal deposit insurance. Bank holding
companies and thrifts were not FDIC-insured, meaning the FDIC did not have the statutory
authority to impose additional fees on them. To compensate for the fact that they would not
be liable in the event of program losses, the FDIC decided to raise the standard assessment
fee by 10 basis points on holding companies where FDIC-insured institutions consisted of
less than half of the firm’s portfolio (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72251, 2008).
Recognizing this legal challenge, Congress amended FDICIA to allow the FDIC to collect
special assessments on depository institution holding companies in May 2009 as part of the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act (GAO, 2010).
11. No additional conditions were imposed on participating institutions.
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The CPP imposed several conditions on participating institutions, including restrictions on
executive compensation and a prohibition on increasing dividends. These conditions were
not adopted for the DGP.
12. Initially, the guarantee could only be exercised following a bankruptcy/resolution
of the institution issuing the debt, but the FDIC later adopted a first payment
default standard.
Initially, the FDIC said it would only fulfill the guarantee if the debtor declared
bankruptcy/entered resolution, at which point the FDIC would pay the creditor the
remaining balance plus interest and require the creditor to turn over all claims to the
debtor’s assets to the FDIC. However, some worried that this approach would prevent the
timely exercise of the guarantee and curtail demand for guaranteed debt. In particular,
ratings agencies indicated an unwillingness to treat guaranteed debt as government
securities (and therefore AAA rated) unless payment was made on default. Thus, if guarantee
payments were not delivered in a timely manner, then only the largest institutions deemed
already creditworthy would be able to access interbank lending markets, locking out smaller
firms without credit ratings. Additionally, since the UK’s Credit Guarantee Scheme paid
creditors following the first default on payment, participants worried that UK banks would
receive a competitive advantage over U.S. ones (Federal Register 73 [229]: 72263, 2008). For
these reasons, the FDIC changed the DGP such that the first payment default on covered debt
would trigger the guarantee.
13. The issuance window was initially set to expire on June 30, 2009, but the FDIC
extended it to October 31, 2009, and established a six-month Emergency
Guarantee Facility through April 30, 2010.
In spring 2009, the FDIC believed that liquidity in financial markets had not returned to precrisis levels and worried that an abrupt end to the DGP would lead to market disruption. To
ensure an orderly termination of the DGP, officials designed the program’s phase-out to
make it slowly uneconomical to issue guaranteed debt (Treasury, 2009). The first extension,
from April 1, 2009, to October 31, 2009, raised the participation fee by 25 basis points for
FDIC-insured institutions and 50 basis points for holding companies and thrifts. Eligible
institutions that had not issued guaranteed debt by that date had to apply for inclusion in the
program to prevent program participation from ballooning. All fees collected under the
extension were directly deposited into the Deposit Insurance Fund to shore up the FDIC’s
balance sheet. The FDIC guaranteed debt issued under the extension through December 31,
2012 (Federal Register 74(105), 2009).
By October, the FDIC recognized that certain firms, due to exogenous market disruptions or
other factors beyond their control, found it difficult to roll over their guaranteed debt.
Therefore, officials established the Emergency Guarantee Facility to guarantee debt issued
between October 31, 2009, and April 30, 2010. Institutions had to apply with the FDIC to
issue guaranteed debt until April 30, 2010. The FDIC charged a participation fee of at least
300 basis points, and only firms that previously issued DGP-guaranteed debt were allowed
to apply (to limit participation). The FDIC designed the extension to maximize regulatory
discretion. All institutions approved to participate in the emergency facility had to be in some
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extreme, unique circumstance, so FDIC granted regulators the authority to carefully tailor
participation requirements on a case-by-case basis (Federal Register 74 [204], 2009).
Ultimately, no institutions made use of the Emergency Guarantee Facility.

III. Evaluation
Economic Consequences
There is overall consensus that the DGP lowered borrowing costs for banks and improved
liquidity in unsecured interbank markets. Although the near-simultaneous announcement of
other liquidity-boosting measures like the Treasury Department’s CPP and the Fed’s CPFF
makes it seem difficult to isolate the individual effect of the DGP on overall credit markets,
comparing guaranteed debt to non-guaranteed debt issued by the same institutions provides
a means to evaluate the program’s effects.
In its report on the DGP, the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009) measured the DGP’s effect
on interest rates using two methods, one that computed the average interest rate spread
between guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt issued during the program period by the
same institution, and one that examined average difference in yield between guaranteed
debt and debt trading on secondary markets that was issued before October 2008. The Panel
estimated that the DGP lowered borrowing costs by between about 150-300 basis points, for
total savings of between $13.4 billion and $28.9 billion (COP, 2009). Those estimates indicate
that the program resulted in a net subsidy for banks, since participating institutions only
paid $10.4 billion in fees. This methodology is limited by the fact that many issuers of
guaranteed bonds did not simultaneously issue debt without the guarantee, since total issues
did not exceed the 125% cap. Using a multivariate regression framework to control for other
factors influencing bond yields, Ambrose et al (2013) found that FDIC-backed debt cost 132
basis points less than non-FDIC-backed debt, a slightly lower benefit for banks that more
closely aligns with the fees paid (Ambrose et al, 2013).
Using a similar methodology to Ambrose et al, Black et al (2015) found an average reduction
in borrowing costs similar in magnitude to Ambrose’s estimate. However, the study also
found a significant effect of bond maturity on the benefit to banks. The benefit decreased
with maturity, such that the guarantee lowered borrowing costs more for short-term bonds
than for long-term bonds (Black et al, 2015). This result seems to run counter to the
program’s goal of encouraging medium-to-long-term borrowing. However, given that the
lion’s share of bonds issued under DGP had maturities of over a year, those apparently
misaligned incentives may not have outweighed other considerations affecting the term on
debt issues. It is also possible that the larger benefit for short-term bonds merely reflected
that prevailing market rates for short-term debt were more disrupted by market conditions
than for long-term debt in 2008-09.
In addition to lowering borrowing costs, both Black and Ambrose found that the DGP
improved bank liquidity. As a result, banks were able to meet their rollover and mediumterm financing needs, reducing their default risk. However, Ambrose argues that
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announcement of DGP participation signaled a bank’s weakness, offsetting greater
confidence in bank solvency and resulting in a net decline in share price (Ambrose 2013).
Black disagrees, and finds that, while share prices did continue to slide after institutions
announced they would participate, the rate of decline slowed for participating institutions
relative to non-participants (Black 2015).
By reducing the risk of bank failure and improving market liquidity, the DGP produced
spillover benefits both for participating institutions and the unsecured debt market as a
whole. Black et al measured higher liquidity for non-guaranteed bonds issued by banks
participating in the program (Black 2015). Ambrose et al found that participating
institutions enjoyed lower borrowing costs on non-guaranteed debt, while all banks,
regardless of whether or not they issued guaranteed bonds, enjoyed lower spreads
(Ambrose et al, 2013).
Although fees collected under the program significantly exceeded payouts, some argue that
there were several types of costs associated with the program. Veronesi and Zingales (2009)
multiply the total amount of guaranteed debt issued by the CDS rates at participating
institutions, subtract revenue from fees collected, and arrive at an expected net cost of about
$11 billion over three years (Veronesi and Zingales 2009).
The program may have led to other indirect costs as well. Hoelscher et al (2013) estimated
that firms with weaker credit ratings received a greater benefit under the program,
suggesting that the DGP subsidized riskier firms with more reckless credit management. In
doing so, the guarantee program may have facilitated risky behavior and created market
distortions by allocating resources to banks that use them inefficiently. Additionally, the
Government Accountability Office warned that the guarantee program weakened the
incentive for creditors to monitor risk-taking and restrict lending to irresponsible banks. The
DGP may have contributed to a moral hazard problem by creating the perception that the
government would intervene in the future to solve liquidity problems (GAO, 2010).
Overall, the DGP is seen as helping restore confidence in interbank lending markets. The GAO
concluded in its report that to the extent that DGP “helped banking organizations to raise
funds during a very difficult period and to do so at substantially lower cost than would
otherwise be available, it may have helped improve confidence in institutions and their
ability to lend” (GAO, 2010).

Legal Dispute
The FDIC enacted the DGP under the authority of the FDICIA, which required the FDIC to use
the least costly method of resolving troubled financial institutions unless doing so would
cause systemic risk. Once two-thirds of the FDIC’s Board of Directors, two-thirds of the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and the Treasury Secretary in consultation with the
President made a systemic risk determination, the FDIC was authorized to “take other action
or provide assistance” to mitigate adverse economic effects. In October 2008, the FDIC (in
consultation with relevant authorities) made a systemic risk determination and created the
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DGP under its authority to “take other action” to restore financial stability. That
interpretation raised numerous legal concerns (GAO 2010). First, the statute states that a
systemic risk determination can only be made when the FDIC’s least-cost compliance “with
respect to an insured depository institution” would cause adverse economic conditions,
suggesting that the exception only applies when least-cost FDIC assistance to a specific
institution would cause adverse economic conditions. By contrast, to establish the DGP, the
FDIC made a “generic systemic risk determination […] generically for all institutions” with
respect to the “US banking system in general.” Second, the statute suggested that the FDIC
only had the authority to extend special assistance to institutions with specific problems, not,
as under the DGP, to all institutions involved in a problem affecting the banking system as a
whole. Third, the systemic risk exception was structured to waive only the least-cost
restrictions, meaning that “other action” was still subject to the general restraints on FDIC
assistance that expressly prohibit many DGP provisions. Fourth, precedent set by previous
systemic risk determinations made by the FDIC suggested a more restrictive reading of the
statute, since officials only authorized unconventional assistance to individual institutions if,
individually, they were systemically important. Finally, the FDICIA’s history suggests that
Congress did not intend to grant the FDIC broad authority to enact programs like DGP. The
least-cost resolution was enacted to constrain the FDIC’s resolution authority; the systemic
risk exception replaced a more permissive exemption under the original Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.
In the face of those criticisms, the FDIC justified its authority to enact DGP by pointing to
ambiguities in the statute that suggested their authority to take broader actions in the face
of systemic risk. First, the FDIC argued the exception allows a generic determination, since
U.S. code allows the phrase “with respect to an insured depository institution” to be read as
“with respect to one or more institutions.” Second, the FDIC interpreted FDICIA’s
authorization to “take other action or provide assistance under this section” as permitting
two types of activities: first, to “provide assistance under this section,” subject to the general
restrictions on FDIC assistance; and second, to “take other action,” not subject to the
restrictions “under this section.” Under this interpretation, DGP constituted “other action”
not subject to the traditional restrictions on assistance to insured depository institutions. To
justify this reading, the FDIC: (1) argued the conjunction “or” suggested differentiation
between two different types of activity; and (2) cited the statutory construction principle
called the “grammatical rule of the last antecedent” which calls for “under this section” to be
read as only modifying “provide assistance,” not “take other action.” Third, including the
systemic risk exception indicated that Congress intended to allow the FDIC to take action
aimed at preventing the overall failure of the financial system. Thus, in an unexpected
circumstance like the 2008 financial crisis, the statute authorizes the FDIC to provide generic
assistance to members of the banking industry to facilitate financial stability. Fourth, the
FDIC pointed to Congress’ May 2009 amendment to the FDICIA allowing special assessments
on bank holding companies as evidence that legislators tacitly endorsed the DGP. Finally, the
FDIC noted that historically, in the face of statutory ambiguities, the Supreme Court has
urged substantial deference to agencies’ interpretations (GAO, 2010).
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)
eliminated the FDIC’s ability to create a widely available guarantee program like DGP
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without explicit Congressional approval under the systemic risk exception. However, under
certain circumstances, Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to establish a program to guarantee
obligations of solvent insured depository institutions and holding companies. First, if twothirds of the FDIC’s Board of Directors, two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
and the Treasury Secretary determine that there are “broad and exceptional” reductions in
asset resale values or “unusual and significant” inabilities of financial institutions to sell
unsecured debt, the FDIC can declare that a “liquidity event” exists that warrants the use of
a guarantee program. Then, the FDIC, in consultation with the Treasury Department and
following presidential recommendation, can propose a specific debt guarantee program to
Congress, including a limit on the maximum amount of debt that the program will cover.
Following congressional authorization, the FDIC may initiate the program. In the event that
a participating institution defaults on guaranteed debt, the FDIC must place the institution
in receivership. Dodd-Frank also allows the FDIC to guarantee an individual institution’s
unsecured debt after placing it in receivership (12 USC Section 5611-12).
The total amount of debt that could potentially be guaranteed by the DGP’s, and thus, could
be subject to losses was about $1.75 trillion (Black et al, 2015). The sweeping range of the
program motivated Dodd-Frank’s restriction of the FDIC’s ability to enact broad guarantee
programs. Legislators believed that regulators should not have the authority to subject
taxpayers to trillions of dollars of risk without congressional approval. Additionally, by
making explicit the requirement that the FDIC only cover debt for solvent institutions, DoddFrank aimed to limit moral hazard associated with future guarantee programs (111-176 U.S.
Senate, 2010). While in theory requiring congressional approval provides a prudent check
on regulatory overreach, some argue that the new hurdles to establishing a guarantee
program may cause toxic political consequences with damaging economic implications
during crises (Gordon and Muller, 2011). First, specifically requiring presidents to ask
Congress for a debt guarantee program would force the administration to publicly take
complete political ownership over a major bank assistance program. Second, it is unclear
whether Congress would be willing to authorize trillions of dollars in guarantees, even if such
a magnitude might be necessary in a crisis. Both those dynamics mean that Congress may
only approve a very limited guarantee scheme inadequate in scope to make a meaningful
difference during a major liquidity crunch. Third, both Congress and the president might be
tempted to push the FDIC to provide guarantees by placing institutions in receivership, an
option with less political fallout but negative economic consequences. By effectively
nationalizing major banks in a crisis, regulators could accelerate financial collapse by
encouraging lenders to hoard capital in anticipation of major haircuts following receivership.
Critics of Dodd-Frank argue that the “triple-key” approach previously in force under FDICIA,
which required approval from supermajorities of both the FDIC and Fed Boards in addition
to the executive branch, checks against imprudent guarantees without unduly constraining
regulators during crises.
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ndrew%20Metrick%20Guarantees%20and%20Capital%20Incusions%20in%20Response
%20to%20Financial%20Crises%20B%20US%20Guarantees%20During%20the%20Globa
l%20Financial%20Crisis%2007-15-2015.pdf.
Implementation Documents
Guidance for Election Options and Reporting Instructions – notification for eligible
institutions of the proper procedure/deadlines for opting in/out of the DGP as well as outlining
debt
reporting
requirements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Extension%20of%20Deadli
nes%20and%20Election%20Instructions.pdf.
Election Form Instructions – line-item instructions for filling out the election form.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ELECTION%20FORM%20I
NSTRUCTIONS.pdf.

569

Debt Guarantee Program of the TLGP

Katz

TLGP Election Form – form submitted by all eligible institutions indicating whether the
institution would participate in the program and whether it would issue debt under the 125%
cap.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20TEMPORARY%20
LIQUIDITY%20GUARANTEE%20PROGRAM%20ELECTION%20FORM%20.pdf.
Guaranteed Debt Reporting Instructions – updated instructions for financial institutions on
how
to
report
issuances
of
guaranteed
debt
through
FDICconnect.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDICGuaranteed%20Debt%20Reporting%20Instructions.pdf.
Debt Guarantee Program Master Agreement – contract signed by all participating institutions
that
outlines
the
obligations
of
both
FDIC
and
the
debt
issuer.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/TLGP%20MASTER%20AGR
EEMENT.pdf.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
TLGP Final Rule – final rule for TLGP, including DGP, published in the Federal Register.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Federal%20Regist
er%20Federal%20Deposit%20Insurance%20Corporation%2011-26-2008.PDF.
FINRA Regulatory Notice 08-75 – notice on treating FDIC-guaranteed debt as Trade Reporting
and
Compliance
Engine
(TRACE)
eligible
securities.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDICGuaranteed%20Securities%20and%20TRACE%20Eligibility.pdf.
Exchange between SEC and FDIC regarding SEC Coverage of Guaranteed Debt – request from
FDIC for SEC to confirm FDIC’s interpretation of the Securities Act of 1933 to exempt
guaranteed debt on the grounds that it is guaranteed by an instrument of the US. Original letter
from
FDIC
to
SEC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC_letter_to_SEC.pdf;
Response
from
SEC
to
FDIC:
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/SEC_re_FDIC.pdf.
FIRNA Regulatory Notice 09-38 – guidance on the treatment of guaranteed unsecured debt
for regulatory purposes (under SEC’s Net Capital and Reserve Formula rules).
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Regulatory%20Notice%200
9-38.pdf.
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1108 – Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulatory
guidance letter discussing registration of FDIC-guaranteed bonds with OCC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/int1108.pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
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FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity (10/14/2008) – official FDIC press release
outlining
the
basics
of
TLGP,
including
DGP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/fcic-docs/2008-1014%20FDIC%20plan%20to%20free%20up%20liquidity.pdf.
FDIC Chair’s Statement Announcing the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program – Joint
Press Conference with Treasury and Federal Reserve (10/14/2008) – FDIC chair’s statement
announcing
the
launch
of
the
TLGP,
including
DGP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Press%20Release
s%20Statement%20by%20Federal%20Deposit%20Insurance%20Corporation%20Chairm
an%20Sheila%20Bair%2010-14-2008.PDF.
FDIC Announces Series of Banker Calls on Its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(10/16/2008) – FDIC press release announcing conference calls to field technical questions
regarding
TLGP
provisions,
including
DGP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Announces%20Se
ries%20of%20Banker%20Calls%20on%20Its%20Temporary%20Liquidity%20Guarantee
%20Program.pdf.
Agencies Encourage Participation in Treasury's Capital Purchase Program, FDIC's
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (10/20/2008) – joint statement by FDIC, Treasury
Department, and Federal Reserve urging institutions to participate in the DGP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2008%2010%2020%20Age
ncies%20Encourage%20Participation%20in%20Treasury's%20Capital%20Purchase%20
Program,%20FDIC's%20Temporary%20Liquidity%20Guarantee%20Program.pdf.
FDIC Issues Interim Rule to Implement the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(10/23/2008) – FDIC press release announcing publication of interim rule to implement TLGP
(including
DGP)
with
a
15-day
comment
period.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Issues%20Interim
%20Rule%20to%20Implement%20the%20TLGP.pdf.
FDIC Chair’s Statement on the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program Interim Rule
(10/23/2008) – FDIC Chair’s statement announcing the TLGP interim rule, including DGP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Chairman%20Stat
ement%20The%20Temporary%20Liquidity%20Guarantee%20Program%2010-232008.PDF.
FDIC Extends Opt-Out Deadline for Participation in the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program (11/03/2008) – FDIC press release announcing an extension of the opt-out deadline
for
TLGP
(and
DGP)
from
November
12
to
December
5.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Extends%20OptOut%20Deadline%20for%20Participation%20in%20the%20Temporary%20Liquidity%2
0Guarantee%20Program%20Unveils%20the%20Election%20Form%20to%20Opt%20Ou
t%20of%20the%20Program.pdf.
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FDIC Board of Directors Approves TLGP Final Rule (11/21/2008) – FDIC press release
announcing the approval of the TLGP (and DGP) final rule, detailing the major changes from
the
interim
rule.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC_%20Press%20Release
s%20-%20PR-122-2008%2011_21_2008.pdf.
FDIC Extends the Debt Guarantee Component of Its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(03/17/2009) – FDIC press release announcing the extension of the DGP to October 31, 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/%20%20Press%20Releases
%20%20FDIC%20Extends%20the%20Debt%20Guarantee%20Component%20of%20Its
%20Temporary%20Liquidity%20Guarantee%20Program.pdf.
FDIC Board Approves Phase Out of Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program Debt Guarantee
Program to End October 31st (09/09/2009) – FDIC press release confirming end of DGP and
announcing plans for creating a six-month Emergency Guarantee Facility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FDIC%20Board%20Approv
es%20Phase%20Out.pdf.
GE Capital Announces Participation in FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(11/12/08) – GE Capital letter to investors announcing their participation in the Debt
Guarantee
Program.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GE_Capital%20Letter_1112
2008.pdf.
Media Stories
Banks Drop FDIC Crutch (Fortune, 05/12/09) – article discussing banks’ decisions to wean
themselves
off
issuing
FDIC-backed
debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Banks%20drop%20FDIC%
20crutch%20-%20May.%2012,%202009.pdf.
Banks Profit from US Guarantee (Wall Street Journal, 07/28/09) – article estimating the cost
savings to banks, noting the success of the program in limiting borrowing costs and
highlighting
the
impact
of
savings
to
banks.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Banks%20Profit%20From
%20U.S.%20Guarantee.pdf.
Banks Face Loss of Debt Guarantee (Wall Street Journal, 09/10/09) – article discussing the
DGP’s
phase-out
and
legacy.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Banks%20Face%20Loss%2
0of%20Debt%20Guarantee.pdf.
Key Academic Papers
The Financial Crisis and Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: Their Impact on FixedIncome Markets (Ambrose et al, 2013) – examination of the impact of the DGP on guaranteed
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bond prices, overall borrowing costs, market liquidity, and bank solvency.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/The%20Financial%20Crisis
%20and%20Temporary%20Liquidity%20Guarantee%20Program%20Their%20Impact%20on%20Fixed-Income%20Markets.pdf.
Paulson’s Gift (Veronesi and Zingales 2010) – examination of the net welfare impact of the
Columbus Day interventions on the nine banks that received capital infusions from Treasury.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Paulson's%20Gift.pdf.
Benefits of Government Bank Debt Guarantees: Evidence from the Debt Guarantee Program
(Black et al, 2015) – examination of the effect of the DGP on bond liquidity, borrowing costs,
default
risk,
and
equity
value
during
the
financial
crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Benefits%20of%20Govern
ment%20Bank%20Debt%20Guarantees%20Evidence%20from%20the%20Debt%20Guarantee%20Program.pdf.
Was Bond Insurance a Gift from the FDIC? (Hoelscher et al, 2013) – study of the effect of the
DGP’s term structure on strong and weak banks to determine the relative subsidies that
different
classes
of
firms
received
during
the
crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Was%20Bond%20Insuranc
e%20a%20Gift%20from%20the%20FDIC.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
Public Guarantees on Bank Bonds: Effects and Distortions (OECD, 2011) – comparison of
international bond guarantee programs and evaluation of the potential for such programs to
introduce
distortions
in
the
financial
sector.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Grande%20%20Public%20Guarantees%20on%20Bank%20Bonds.pdf.
Guarantees and Contingent Payments in TARP and Related Programs (Congressional
Oversight Panel, 2009) – Congressional Oversight Panel evaluation of the creation, structure,
cost/benefit, market impact, and broader effect of federal guarantees, including the DGP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Congressional%20Oversigh
t%20Panel%20November%20Oversight%20Report%2011-06-2009.PDF.
The Other Part of the Bailout: Pricing and Evaluating the US and UK Loan Guarantees (Center
for Economic and Policy Research, 2008) – CEPR discussion of the differences between the U.S.
and UK programs and the effect of those design differences on the financial system.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/The%20other%20part%20
of%20the%20bailout%20Pricing%20and%20evaluating%20the%20US%20and%20UK%20loan%20guarantee
s.pdf.
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